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SWEAT MAKES THE GREEN GRASS GROW:
THE PRECARIOUS FUTURE OF QATAR'S
MIGRANT WORKERS IN THE RUN UP TO
THE 2022 FIFA WORLD CUP UNDER THE
KAFALA SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR EFFECTIVE REFORM
PAULA RENKIEWICZ*
Migrant labor in Qatar is increasing as Qatar makes preparations to host
the 2022 FIFA World Cup. Under the kafala system, Qatar's sponsorship
system, migrant workers must seek sponsorship to enter Qatar and be eligible to
work. As it stands, the kafala system places tremendous power in the hands of
sponsors, giving them control over a migrant's freedom to change employment
or leave the country. This imbalance of power subjects migrants to various
forms of exploitation and furnishes conditions fit for human trafficking.
Human trafficking for the purpose of labor exploitation represents a large
proportion of human trafficking cases. The UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress,
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, is an
international convention that requires a comprehensive international
approach among state parties to prevent human trafficking, protect victims,
and prosecute traffickers. As a party, Qatar is required to uphold the UN
Trafficking Protocol's object and purpose. This Comment argues that Qatar's
restrictive sponsorship system perpetuates human trafficking by exploiting
migrant workers. Qatar is violating its obligations under the UN Trafficking
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Protocol and, therefore, must reform its kafala system to comply with the
Protocol's mandates. Given Qatar's increasing reliance upon migrant labor
for the 2022 World Cup preparations, Qatar must act promptly to protect the
rights of migrant workers.
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INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2022, Qatar will be the first Middle Eastern
nation to host the F6d6ration Internationale de Football Association
(FIFA) World Cup.' The World Cup is an international football
tournament held every four years, and it is one of the largest sporting
events worldwide.2  Unfortunately, this honor comes at a price-
approximately one hundred billion in construction costs and the
death of an estimated 4000 migrant laborers.' With the 2022 World
Cup quickly approaching, Qatar is relying on migrant workers to
build new infrastructure, including stadiums, hotels, rail projects, and
a new airport.4 The high demand that comes with the honor of
hosting a mega-sporting event such as the World Cup often leads to
the exploitation of migrant workers involved in preparation for it.'
Take for instance lok, a sixteen-year-old boy from Nepal.' Iok
sought employment abroad.' Because he was too young to do so
legally, lok obtained a fake passport with the help of a labor broker
1. Nigel G. Crocombe, Note, Building a New Future: The 2022 FIFA World Cup as
a Potential Catalyst for Labor Reform in Qatar, 37 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 33, 33
(2014); Russia and Qatar Awarded 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cups, FIFA (Dec. 2,
2010), http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/news/y=-2010/m=12/news=russia-and-qatar-
awarded-2018-and-2022-fifa-world-cups-1344698.html; see also FfDtRATION
INTERNATIONALE DE FOOTBALL ASSOCIATION, ALL ABOUT FIFA 6, 10, 15,
http://resources.fifa.com/mm/document/fifafacts/organisation/02/13/11/06/030
72013allaboutfifa neutral.pdf (indicating that FIFA was established in 1904, and its
mission is to protect the game of football and to "develop the game, touch the world
and build a better future"). For the purposes of this Comment, the term "football"
refers to "soccer" (the term used in the United States).
2. See Kenneth Korosi et al., Foreword, 21 Sw. J. INT'L L. 1, 3 (2014) ("[T]his
opportunity to host the [World Cup] comes with a hopeful economic boom and
sense of pride and honor for a host country.").
3. Christopher Ingraham, (Updated) The Toll of Human Casualties in Qatar, WASH.
Posr (May 27, 2015), http://www.washingtonpostcom/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/05/27/
a-body-count-in-qatar-illustrates-the-consequences-of-fifa-corruption.
4. AMS. FOR DEMOCRACY & HuMAN RIGHTS IN BAHR., SLAVING AWAY: MIGRANT
LABOR EXPLOITATION AND HUMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE GULF 29 (2014),
http://adhrb.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/ADHRBSlaving-Away-Migrant-
Rights-and-Human-Trafficking-the-the-Gulf-Web-Pre-Publication.pdf.
5. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WORLD REPORT 2015, at 37 (2015) [hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH], https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2Ol5_-web.pdf
(citing the abuse and exploitation of migrant workers as one of five main abuses that
correspond with mega-sporting events).
6. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, at 8 (2015)
[hereinafter TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015], http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/245365.pdf.
7. Id.
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so that he could present himself as twenty years of age.' The labor
broker found lok a job in Qatar, but charged lok an illegal
recruitment fee for doing so.' Even before lok arrived in Qatar, his
debt already started to pile up because the labor broker charged him
a thirty-six percent interest rate on the recruitment fee."o Two
months after arriving in Qatar, lok died of cardiac arrest while
working under harsh conditions." Iok's parents never received
money for the two months lok worked."
Many migrants working in Qatar experience circumstances similar
to lok's." Qatar's rapidly increasing economy has led to a surge in
migrant workers."4 With the 2022 World Cup preparations, migrant
worker deaths have become more apparent.' 5 However, even before
FIFA announced the 2022 World Cup would be held in Qatar, there
were increasing reports of migrant worker deaths in the country."
Migrants working in areas such as construction are often forced to
work long shifts, sometimes between twelve and fourteen hours a day,
while facing sweltering temperatures of up to 100 degrees.' 7 It is not
uncommon for migrant workers to suffer heat strokes or heart
attacks, which often lead to death.'" The working and living






13. See AMS. FOR DEMOCRACY & HUMAN RIGHTS IN BAHR., supra note 4, at 28
(explaining that many employers confiscate migrant workers' passports, delay or fail
to pay wages to their workers, and subject workers to dangerous working conditions).
14. See Crocombe, supra note 1, at 35-37, 40-41. See generally BEATE ANDREES ET
AL., INT'L LABOUR ORG., REGULATING LABOUR RECRUITMENT TO PREVENT HUMAN
TRAFFICKING AND TO FOSTER FAIR MIGRATION: MODELS, CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES 61 (2015), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@dgreports/
@dcomm/documents/publication/wcms_377813-2.pdf (emphasizing the extent of
migrant labor in the Middle East and indicating that the Gulf Cooperation Council
("GCC") countries host more than twenty-two million migrants who generate over
eighty billion dollars in remittances annually worldwide).
15. See AMS. FOR DEMOCRACY& HUMAN RIGHTS IN BAHR., supra note 4, at 29.
16. See Ingraham, supra note 3 (reporting the deaths of over two hundred Indian
workers in Qatar in 2010).
17. AMS. FOR DEMOCRACY & HUMAN RIGHTS IN BAHR., supra note 4, at 28.
18. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 284; see AMS. FOR
DEMOCRACY & HUMAN RIGHTS IN BAHR., supra note 4, at 29-30 (noting the high death
rates for construction workers in Qatar and citing overwork as the cause of death for
276 Nepalese workers in 2013).
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International Trade Union Confederation's ("ITUC") General
Secretary has characterized them as akin to "modern-day slavery.""
The abuse and death of migrant workers in Qatar is closely
connected to Qatar's implementation of its sponsorship system,
known as the kafala system."o The kafala system oversees the extent
of migrant labor by dictating how migrant workers may enter and
leave the country."' For a migrant worker to enter Qatar and be
eligible to work, the worker must seek sponsorship;" the issuance of
employment visas is tied directly to the sponsor." Qatar relies on this
system to monitor the influx of migrant workers due to its increasing
migrant population." Unfortunately, as it stands, Qatar's
sponsorship system places a significant amount of power in the hands
of the sponsors, leading to an unbalanced bargaining structure
between sponsors and employees.2 Under this imbalance, employees
face the risk of exploitation and obstacles such as low wages or no
wages at all, substandard housing conditions, and long working
hours.2 ' This oppressive sponsorship system makes it nearly
impossible for migrants to escape abysmal working conditions and
19. HtLtNE HARROFF-TAVEL 8 ALIX NASRI, INT'L LABOUR ORG., TRICKED AND
TRAPPED: HuMAN TRAFFICKING IN THE MIDDLEEAst 116 (2013), http://www.ilo.org/
wcmsp5/groups/public/-arabstates/-ro-beirut/documents/publication/wcmsL 211214.pdf
(quoting ITUC Confronts Qatari Labour Minister with New Evidence of Abuse of Migrant
Workers, INT'L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION (June 12, 2012), http://www.ituc-
csi.org/ituc-confronts-qatari-labour?lang=en.
20. See Ingraham, supra note 3 (criticizing the kafala system for "leaving the door
wide open for exploitation and abuse"). See generally infra Section I.C (explaining
what the kafala system is).
21. See MIGRANT FORuM IN ASIA, POLICY BRIEF No. 2: REFORM OF THE KAFALA
(SPONSORSHIP) SYSEM 1, http://mfasia.org/resources/publications/464-mfa-policy-brief.
22. Id.
23. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 18.
24. Heather E. Murray, Note, Hope for Reform Springs Eternal: How the Sponsorship
System, Domestic Laws and Traditional Customs Fail to Protect Migrant Domestic Workers in
GCC Countries, 45 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 461, 467 (2012) (explaining that the kafala
system, created by the GCC countries in the 1950s, allows the Qatari government to
regulate labor flow in and out of Qatar); see also Hila Shamir, A Labor Paradigm for
Human Trafficking, 60 UCLA L. REV. 76, 115 (2012) (stating that countries that adopt
systems like the kafala system do so to "limit the entry of migrant workers ... and to
regulate the eligibility of the various labor sectors to employ migrant workers").
25. See MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 1 (finding that the imbalance in
power between a sponsor and an employee creates "an environment ripe for human
rights violations").
26. HARROFF-TAVEL & NASRI, supra note 19, at 15.
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abusive employers. Because of the high probability of exploitation
under Qatar's kafala system, migrant workers are at risk of becoming
victims of human trafficking.2"
Human trafficking is a growing phenomenon that exists in every
country.29 According to the United Nations (UN), human trafficking
is ranked as the third largest profit center for transnational crime.so
The trafficking of humans for forced labor represents a large
proportion of international human trafficking cases." In 2014, the
International Labour Organization (ILO) estimated that forced labor
in the private economy accumulates $150 billion in illicit profits
annually.2 The extent of forced labor is so significant that it creates
complex supply chains crossing international borders and tainting
purchases; as such, consumers of goods and services are closely
27. See AMS. FOR DEMOCRACY & HUMAN RIGHTS IN BAHR., supra note 4, at 5
(describing how, under the kafala system, it is illegal for an employee to seek
alternate employment in the hopes of escaping an abusive employer).
28. See id. (explaining that many migrant workers are forced into labor camps or
are sold into sex slavery).
29. STEPHANIE HEPBURN & RITA J. SIMON, HUMAN TRAFFICKING AROUND THE
WORLD: HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT 1 (2013).
30. See Kevin Bales, International Labor Standards: Quality of Information and
Measures of Progress in Combating Forced Labor, 24 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 321, 324
(2003) (stating that drugs and weapons trafficking rank first and second as the
largest profit centers for transnational crime); see also HARROFF-TAVEL & NASRI, supra
note 19, at 24 (referencing the International Labour Organization's estimate that the
"opportunity cost" of forced labor trafficking amounts to over twenty billion dollars
annually); HEPBURN & SIMON, supra note 29, at 1 (indicating that as of 2005, the
human trafficking industry made a worldwide profit of 44.3 billion dollars). See
generally INT'L LABOUR OFFICE, INT'L LABOUR ORG., PROFITS AND POVERTY: THE
EcoNOMIcs OF FORCED LABOUR 10, 12 (2014), http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/
public/-ed-norm/-declaration/docuents/publication/wcms_243391.pdf
(attributing the high profits of forced labor trafficking to underpaid wages, wage
retention, debt repayments, and illegal recruitment fees).
31. See HEPBURN & SIMON, supra note 29, at 1 ("The International Labour
Organization (ILO) estimated that [in 2005,] [forty-three] percent of victims were
trafficked for commercial sexual exploitation, [thirty-two] percent were trafficked for
forced labor, and the remaining [twenty-five] percent were trafficked for a mixture
of both or for undetermined reasons.").
32. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 13 (asserting that
the profits acquired through forced labor fall into a complex supply chain that crosses
international borders and corrupts the global economy); see also UNITED NATIONS OFFICE
ON DRUGS AND CRIME, GLOBAL REPORT ON TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 2014 33 (2014)
[hereinafter GLOBAL REPORT], https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/glotip/GLOTIP 2014_full-report.pdf (noting that forced labor includes
manufacturing, cleaning, construction, textile production, domestic servitude, and
other forms of labor).
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connected to human trafficking." In many instances, victims of
forced labor are subject to abuse and exploitation that is just as
horrific as the abuse victims of sex trafficking experience." Female
victims of forced labor, especially those in domestic servitude, are
often victims of sexual exploitation as well as labor exploitation."
Deplorable working conditions endanger the lives of many forced
laborers." This is especially true in Qatar." Unless Qatar's
government takes action to reform its sponsorship system and remedy
the mistreatment and exploitation of its migrant workers, the death
toll of migrant workers building the World Cup infrastructure will be
greater than the number of players participating in the tournament."
This Comment will argue that Qatar's implementation of its kafala
system leads to the exploitation and trafficking of migrant workers.
Qatar's traditional sponsorship system reflects the Qatari
government's complicity in human trafficking, which violates the UN
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children ("UN Trafficking Protocol"). Qatar
must reform its kafala system to comply with the UN Trafficking
Protocol and to combat the human trafficking of migrant workers.
Part I will provide an overview of the criminal enterprise of human
trafficking, focusing on the trafficking of humans for forced labor. It
will examine migrant labor and human trafficking in Qatar, as well as
Qatar's sponsorship system, the kafala system. Part I will also explore
33. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 13 (pointing out
that human trafficking is tied to the extractive stages of a good (such as mining), the
manufacturing stage (where separate pieces are combined), and the production
stage (where a good is assembled and packaged)).
34. May Li, Note, Did Indiana Deliver in Its Fight Against Human Trafficking?: A
Comparative Analysis Between Indiana's Human Trafficking Laws and the International
Legal Framework, 23 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 277, 288-92 (2013) (describing sexual
exploitation and labor exploitation, which entail similar forms of abuse); see
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, Forced Labour, Human Trafficking and Slavery,
http://www.ilo.org/global/topics/forced-labour/lang-en/index.htm (stating that
out of nineteen million forced labor victims exploited by private individuals or
enterprises, 4.5 million are victims of forced sexual exploitation).
35. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 8.
36. See INT'L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, SPECIAL REPORT: THE CASE AGAINST
QATAR 16, 18 (2014) [hereinafter THE CASE AGAINST QATAR], http://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/the-case-againstqatar-en-webl70314.pdf (observing that deaths
attributed to poor working conditions include work accidents, heart attacks, or
diseases from squalid living conditions).
37. Id.
38. Crocombe, supra note 1, at 34-35.
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relevant legal instruments, such as international treaties and Qatari laws,
and their approach to tackling human trafficking and forced labor.
Part II will argue that because the implementation of Qatar's kafala
system leads to complicity in human trafficking, the kafala system as it
stands violates the UN Trafficking Protocol. Part II will first analyze
the UN Trafficking Protocol and find that complicity in human
trafficking violates states' responsibilities under the Protocol. Part II
will then explore Qatar's kafala system and find that, because of the
implementation of the kafala system, the Qatari government fails to
satisfy the requirements of the UN Trafficking Protocol.
Part III will argue that Qatar's current efforts to combat human
trafficking are insufficient. Despite the various efforts in place,
Qatar's sponsorship system remains, and so do its consequences.
Qatar will be unable to address its human trafficking problem and
comply with the UN Trafficking Protocol if the kafala system remains
unchanged. Accordingly, Part III will provide recommendations on how
Qatar can reform its kafala system and prevent human trafficking.
This Comment concludes that Qatar must reform its kafala system
to combat human trafficking and comply with the UN Trafficking
Protocol. Given the increase in migrant labor in preparation for the
2022 World Cup, the Qatari government must act promptly to save
hundreds-and maybe thousands-of migrant workers from exploitation.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING AND QATAR'S KAFALA
SYSTEM
A. Introduction to the Criminal Enterprise of Human Trafficking
There are numerous definitions of human trafficking, but the
worldwide standard, as established by the UN, sets forth three
essential elements: (1) an action element; (2) a means element; and
(3) a purpose element." The "action" element refers to the act of
trafficking, such as the recruitment, transportation, harboring, or
receipt of persons; the "means" element refers to the use of threats,
force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, and deception, among
others; and the "purpose" element refers to exploitation.40 All three
39. HEPBURN & SIMON, supra note 29, at 3.
40. Id. See generaly UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, THE CONCEPT OF
"EXPLOITATION" IN THE TRAFFICIuNG IN PERSONS PROTOCOL 23-24 (2015)
[hereinafter THE CONCEPT OF "EXPLOITATION"], https://www.unodc.org/
documents/human-trafficking/2015/UNODCIP Exploitation_ 2015.pdf (viewing the
"action" and "means" elements as the actus reus of trafficking and the "purpose"
element as the mens rea of trafficking).
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elements must be present to establish the offense of human
trafficking; however, the consent of a victim is irrelevant when any
forms of "means" are established." Article 3 of the UN Trafficking
Protocol defines human trafficking as:
[T] he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt
of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving
of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. 2
While the UN Trafficking Protocol provides a helpful definition of
human trafficking, it fails to further define "exploitation.""
However, the "exploitation" or "purpose" factor is the main impetus
for human trafficking."
Human trafficking causes can be attributed to numerous "push and
pull factors."" "Push factors" are the factors that push individuals
from their home countries to destination countries, thereby
supplying traffickers with potential victims." "Pull factors" are the
factors that draw individuals into a specific destination country.4 7
These "push and pull factors" perpetuate the cycle of human
41. GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 15; see THE CONCEPT OF "EXPLOITATION",
supra note 40, at 14 (noting that the "means" element is not required when
trafficking of children is involved).
42. U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, Protocol to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children, art. 3(a), Nov. 15, 2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13127, 2237 U.N.T.S. 304 [hereinafter
UN Trafficking Protocol].
43. See id. (defining "exploitation" as including "the exploitation of the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour ... or
practices similar to slavery "); Jean Allain, No Effective Trafficking Definition Exists:
Domestic Implementation of the Palermo Protocol, 7 ALB. Gov'T L. REv. 111, 120 (2014)
(suggesting that the UN Trafficking Protocol intentionally left the definition of
"exploitation" open-ended to let each state party determine what specific types of
exploitation they would seek to prohibit); see also THE CONCEPT OF "EXPLOITATION",
supra note 40, at 8 (arguing that the UN Trafficking Protocol's definition of
"exploitation" is non-exhaustive and that states are permitted to expand upon the
definition so long as the integrity of the Protocol is retained).
44. See GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 46 (arguing that obtaining economic benefits
from the exploited labor and services of victims is one of the main goals of trafficking).
45. Li, supra note 34, at 287.
46. See id. (citing examples of "push factors" such as lack of employment or
educational opportunities, and economic or political instability in an individual's
home country).
47. See id. (listing examples of "pull factors" including the demand for cheap
labor and the possibility of a higher standard of living).
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trafficking." In countries such as Qatar, the high demand for cheap
labor, combined with weak labor laws and the high rate of unemployment
in developing countries, promotes forced labor trafficking.4 9
The trafficking of humans for the purposes of forced labor is
significant within the various types of human trafficking."o In 2012,
the ILO estimated that 20.9 million people were victims of forced
labor across the world.-" The ILO defines forced labor as "all work or
service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any
penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself
voluntarily."5 2 Victims of forced labor are forced to work in areas
such as construction, domestic work, sweatshops, agriculture, forced
begging, and other sectors." Low-skilled migrant workers are the
most vulnerable to forced labor due to their limited financial
resources and lack of education." In addition, workers are more
likely to become victims of forced labor in industries with short turn-
around for production, such as the construction of infrastructure for
the 2022 World Cup." According to the UN Office on Drugs and
Crime (UNODC), the problem of human trafficking for forced labor
is underestimated because there is a common misperception among
law enforcement and the public that human trafficking only
encompasses sex trafficking."
48. Id.
49. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 18.
50. See Li, supra note 34, at 288, 290 (identifying labor and sex trafficking as the
two most common forms of human trafficking, representing eighteen and seventy-
nine percent of all cases respectively). But see GLOBAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 9
(recognizing other forms of human trafficking, such as the trafficking of children for
armed combat or forced begging, as significant problems).
51. See HARROFF-TAVEL & NAsRI, supra note 19, at 13, 27 (estimating that in 2012,
there were 600,000 victims of forced labor in the Middle East).
52. See id. at 21 (suggesting the inherent notion of exploitation under the
definition of "forced labour" indicates that human trafficking for the purpose of
exploitation is encompassed by this definition of "forced labour").
53. Li, supra note 34, at 290.
54. HARROFF-TAVEL & NASRI, supra note 19, at 14 (explaining how migrant
workers who wish to provide for themselves and their families are attracted to the
idea of working abroad and are often unaware of the risks of exploitation). Some
migrant workers are aware of the future risks of exploitation, but they continue to
seek work abroad because of their poor financial situations and the pressing needs of
their families. Id.
55. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 14.
56. HARROFF-TAVEL & NASRi, supra note 19, at 24.
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B. The Extent of Migrant Labor and Human Trafficking in Qatar
Qatar is rapidly developing into a thriving Middle Eastern nation
due to its lucrative oil and gas industry.17 Because of Qatar's growing
economy, the need for labor has increased and, like other Gulf
Cooperation Council ("GCC") countries," Qatar has become an
attractive destination for migrant workers." Migrants voluntarily seek
work in countries abroad in hopes of fleeing poverty, unemployment,
violence, and natural disasters.' Approximately 1.2 million men and
women migrate to Qatar to seek employment, making up ninety-four
percent of Qatar's population.' Construction and domestic
servitude are the most common fields of work, but other areas
include oil and gas and transportation industries." Despite the
57. Crocombe, supra note 1, at 35-36. See generally AMs. FOR DEMOCRACY & HUMAN
RIGHTS IN BAHR., supra note 4, at 26 (indicating that the oil and gas industry accounts
for over fifty percent of Qatar's total gross domestic product); Cent. Intelligence
Agency, World Fact Book 2013-14: Qatar, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
resources/the-world-factbook/geos/qa.html (last updated Oct. 28, 2015) (citing
Qatar as the country with the highest per-capita income and the lowest
unemployment rate).
58. See generally INT'L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, FACILITATING EXPLOITATION:
A REVIEW OF LABOUR LAWS FOR MIGRANT DoMEsTIc WORKERS IN GULF COOPERATION
COUNCIL COUNTRIES 4 (2014), http://www.ituc-csi.org/IMG/pdf/gcc_1egal-andpolicy
_briefdomesticworkers.final-text clean282_29.pdf (indicating that the GCC is
made up of the following countries: Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, United
Arab Emirates, and Oman).
59. See Crocombe, supra note 1, at 36 (explaining how Qatar's booming economy
has allowed its citizens to enjoy "near-universal employment," but make up only
fifteen percent of the country's population); see also HARROFF-TAVEL & NAsRI, supra
note 19, at 25 (attributing the "capital-rich economies" of GCC countries to the rise
in construction and infrastructure fields that rely on the use of short-term labor).
60. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 17 (examining the
willingness of migrants to work abroad, and in some situations, their willingness to
pay a smuggler to help them enter and obtain work in another country).
61. Alyssa Antoniskis, Column, 2022 World Cup and the Exploitation of Migrant
Workers in Qatar, 20 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 55, 55 (2013). See generally AMs. FOR DEMOCRACY
& HUMAN RIGHTS IN BAHR., supra note 4, at 27 ("The majority of migrant workers [in
Qatar] come from India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the
Philippines."). The high proportion of migrant labor is attributed to the increased
open market ofjobs in the private sector. Id. Qatari nationals are attracted to jobs in
the public sector, which has increased available jobs in the private sector that now
rely upon the labor of migrant workers. Id.
62. See AMS. FOR DEMOCRACY & HUMAN RIGHTS IN BAHR., supra note 4, at 26
(estimating about 506,000 migrants working in the construction field and 84,000
female migrants in the domestic field).
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
promise of good pay and adequate living conditions, migrant workers
face forced labor upon arrival to their worksites.63
The upcoming FIFA World Cup 2022 has increased demand for
domestic labor in Qatar.64 Migrants working in the field of domestic
servitude are vulnerable to various types of abuse and exploitation. 65
In many instances, the domestic worker, usually female, is prohibited
from leaving her employment, underpaid or not paid at all, and
forced to work seven days a week. 6 Often, the abuse of domestic
workers goes unnoticed because authorities cannot inspect private
homes as easily as they can inspect formal workplaces." Female
domestic workers are also more at risk of gender-based violence.6 1 If
women try to report instances of abuse and rape, authorities may
charge them with "illicit relations."'
The announcement of Qatar's 2022 World Cup bid has also
increased the number of migrant laborers in the construction field."o
Migrants working in construction suffer an array of abuses, including
long hours and workplace injuries.n About ten percent of injuries
that occur on construction sites result in permanent disability. 2
Since FIFA awarded the 2022 World Cup bid to Qatar, more than a
thousand migrant workers have died during the construction of new
infrastructure. Over the next few years, Qatar may admit an
63. Mohammad A. Auwal, Ending the Exploitation of Migrant Workers in the Gulf 34
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 87, 90-91 (2010).
64. See INT'L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, supra note 58, at 6-7 (estimating that
the number of workers drafted into domestic servitude is likely to increase due to the
increase in wealth and living standards in Qatar). See generally id. at 9 (referring to
the ILO Domestic Workers Convention No. 189, which defines "domestic work" as
"work performed in or for a household or households").




69. AMS. FOR DEMOCRACY & HUMAN RIGHTS IN BAHR., supra note 4, at 31.
70. See Qatar: No Labourers Killed on World Cup Stadiums But Migrant Rules to
Change, THE GuARDIAN (May 4, 2015,10:08 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2015/may/05/qatar-no-labourers-killed-on-world-cup-stadiums-but-migrant-
rules-to-change (estimating that so far, over 2500 migrant workers have worked for
about 4.8 million hours towards the preparation of the 2022 World Cup).
71. AMS. FOR DEMOCRACY & HUMAN RIGHTS IN BAHR., supra note 4, at 28.
72. Id. at 28; see also id. at 29 (indicating that in 2013, twenty percent of all
migrant worker deaths in Qatar occurred on construction sites).
73. See id. at 30 (citing the deaths of 382 Nepalese workers since 2012 and 717
Indian workers since 2010, and an additional 1000 workers who were admitted to the
trauma unit as a result of injuries sustained from work).
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additional one million migrant workers into its labor force to work in
construction in preparation for the 2022 World Cup. 4
According to the U.S. Department of State's 2015 Trafficking in
Persons Report, Qatar is mostly a destination country for forced labor
trafficking; however, it also serves as a destination country for forced
prostitution." Because Qatar is a popular destination for low-skilled
migrant labor, it is the largest population at risk of human trafficking in
Qatar.76 Further, migrant women in the domestic sector are at increased
risk of human trafficking because of their isolation, and sex traffickers
may force women who escape domestic work into prostitution.77
C. What Is the Kafala System?
The kafala system is a sponsorship system used to monitor migrant
workers.7 1 In the 1950s, the GCC countries established the modern-
day kafala system, under which in-country sponsorship is the only
means of eligibility for a migrant to work in a GCC country.79 The
kafala system is embedded in the historical roots of Arab culture,o
stemming from a custom of Bedouin tribes whereby tribe members
74. Crocombe, supra note 1, at 41 (citing INT'L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION,
UNION VIEW #21: HIDDEN FACES OF THE GULF MIRACLE 3-4 (2011), http://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/VSQatarEN-final.pdf).
75. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 284 (placing Qatar
on the Department of State's Tier 2 Watch List). The Department of State's
Trafficking in Persons Report uses four tiers to rank a government's compliance with
the standards established under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA): Tier
1 encompasses countries whose governments fully comply but human trafficking still
exists; Tier 2 encompasses countries whose governments do not fully comply, but are
making significant efforts to do so; Tier 2 Watch List encompasses the Tier 2
qualifications plus three additional circumstances-in Qatar's case, failure to provide
evidence of increased efforts from the previous year to come into compliance; and
Tier 3 encompasses countries whose governments do not fully comply and are not
making significant efforts to do so. Id. at 53, 284-85. See generally Trafficking Victims
Protection Act, 22 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7112 (2012). The minimum standards for
eliminating human trafficking under the TVPA are consistent with the standards
used by the UN Trafficking Protocol. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra
note 6, at 45.
76. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 284.
77. Id.
78. Murray, supra note 24, at 467.
79. Id. See generally MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 1 (explaining that
one of the original economic goals of the kafala system was to provide temporary
labor that could be quickly provided when needed and removed when unneeded).
80. AMANUEL AJAWIN, ET AL., FAIRLEIGH DICK. U., HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 119
(2012), https://www.un.int/kamal/sites/www.un.int/files/The%20Ambassador's%
20Club%20at%20the%20United%20Nations/publications/ufdu201 lahme.pdf.
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would afford traveling strangers safe passage or, in some cases,
limited affiliation with the tribe." The kafala system mandates that
for the duration of a migrant worker's employment, his legal
immigration status is tied to his employer or sponsor (kafeel).8 The
sponsor (usually an employer) controls a worker's entrance into
Qatar, his ability to transfer employment, and his exit from Qatar."
Law No. 4 of 2009, Regulating the Entry and Exit of Expatriates,
their Residence and Sponsorship, is Qatar's sponsorship law based on
the kafala system." Under Article 2 of this law, each migrant worker
must hold a valid passport, or some form of travel document, and an
entry visa to enter or leave Qatar." To be granted an entry visa, the
worker must have a sponsor who is a Qatari national or "expatriate
resident" under the law, either of whom must be qualified to fulfill
the responsibilities of sponsorship, which include employing and
supervising the migrant worker." Thus, businesses or Qatari nationals
are required to sponsor every migrant worker who wishes to live and
work in Qatar." The law also requires employers or sponsors to secure
residence cards for their employees within seven days of employment."
Many migrant workers experience abuse and exploitation under
Qatar's current kafala system." Before migrants arrive to work in
Qatar, they are often exploited during their search to secure
sponsorship."o This is because migrant workers rely on recruitment
81. Id.
82. MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 1.
83. Id.
84. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BUILDING A BETTER WORLD CUP: PROTECTING MIGRANT
WORKERS IN QATAR AHEAD OF FIFA 2022, at 43, 69 (2012),
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/qatar0612webwcover_0.pdf;
Crocombe, supra note 1, at 57.
85. Law No. 4 of 2009, Regarding Regulation of the Expatriates' Entry, Departure,
Residence and Sponcorship, art. 2 (2009) [hereinafter Law No. 4 of 20091.
86. See id. art. 18 ("[A]Ill Expatriates may only leave the country temporarily or
permanently on submission of an exit permit granted by the residence sponsor."); id.
art. 19 (outlining the requirements of a residence sponsor).
87. See Murray, supra note 24, at 467 (noting that sponsors are legally and financially
responsible for their sponsored migrant workers during the contract period).
88. See Law No. 4 of 2009, supra note 85, arts. 5, 9; TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 286 (observing that a migrant worker's presence is
illegal unless he has a residence card).
89. See HARROFF-TAVEL & NASRI, supra note 19, at 16; Auwal, supra note 63, at 89-
90 (addressing the inadequate pay, squalid housing conditions, physical abuse,
sexual exploitation, and the denial of the freedom to travel that many migrant
workers experience upon arrival to their destination countries).
90. See Auwal, supra note 63, at 92,94 (identifying considerable evidence of dishonest
recruiting efforts such as promises of higher wages and better working conditions).
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agencies and labor brokers to handle their job placements.91 These
recruitment agencies may charge migrants outrageous recruitment
fees to secure work abroad." Deception regarding job conditions,
living conditions, and wages occurs frequently in the recruitment
process." For instance, contract fraud-wherein a worker enters into
an agreement with a labor broker and upon arrival to the destination
country, finds that the terms of the employment have changed-is a
common form of abuse that occurs during the recruitment process.
The kafala system also enables the practice of "visa trading,"" which
occurs when Qatari nationals with business licenses receive
permission to secure work visas for a certain number of foreign
workers." When this occurs, sponsors recruit foreign workers for
non-existent jobs.9 ' Sponsors gain profits by auctioning off the visas
of these foreign workers, while the workers are left stranded in their
destination country with no job and mounting debt," increasing
their susceptibility to suicide.9 9
Once migrant workers finally secure employment and travel to
Qatar, the exploitation continues because the sponsorship system
places great power in the hands of employers and sponsors.'o
Workers are subject to forced labor, debt bondage, physical or
financial harm, hazardous working conditions, delayed or
91. UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, THE ROLE OF RECRUITMENT FEES
AND ABUSIVE AND FRAUDULENT RECRUITMENT PRACTICES OF RECRUITMENT AGENCIES IN
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS 6 (2015), https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-
trafficking/2015/Recruitment FeesReport-Final-22june_201 5_AGFinal.pdf
(citing complex visa procedures and lack of familiarity with the destination country
as reasons why migrants rely on recruitment agencies).
92. Id. at 7.
93. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 15; see AMS. FOR
DEMOCRACY & HUMAN RIGHTS IN BAHR., supra note 4, at 27 (indicating that
recruitment fees can range from $700 to $3500). For a detailed definition of
"recruitment fees," see UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, supra note 91, at 7.
94. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 15 (noting that the
originally proposed job may have never existed and the new job may include longer
hours, lower wages and, in some instances, a different destination country).
95. MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 6.
96. Id.
97. HARROFF-TAVEL & NASRI, supra note 19, at 16.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 104; see infra notes 181-85.
100. E.g., MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 1 (explaining the temporary
nature of migrants' presence in the country, leaving them in the vulnerable position
of employment-by-contract and with few rights).
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nonpayment of salaries, and squalid living conditions.'01 Frequently,
workers are housed in "worker camps," where dozens of workers may
be confined to crammed rooms that lack necessary amenities such as
water and electricity.10 2  Employers also fail to provide migrant
workers with safety training, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of
migrant workers a year due to dangerous working conditions."o0
Migrant workers face difficulty trying to change employment or leave
the country because under the kafala system, an employee cannot
terminate his employment without the consent of his sponsor.'
The kafala system is important to Qatari nationals; although
migrants make up the majority of Qatar's workforce, the kafala
system acts as a tool to help Qatar protect its native population."'
Qatar strives to control the entry of migrant workers, and it seeks to
regulate the eligibility of its labor sectors to employ the migrant
worker population.o'0 Thus, the kafala system assists in regulating the
flow of migrant labor in Qatar.o7 The system also limits the extent to
which workers become citizens, which is important because granting
citizenship to all migrants would greatly diminish Qatar's native
population.'s The kafala system also serves Qatar's interest in cheap
foreign labor.' Unlike in many countries where cheap foreign labor
raises concerns about job competition, such labor is no threat to
Qatar's work force because, as a GCC member, its citizens are
101. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2014 320 (2014),
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2014/index.htm; see Crocombe, supra note 1,
at 44 (recognizing that about one-third of employers fail to pay migrant workers on
time, if at all).
102. See Crocombe, supra note 1, at 39-40 (estimating that "worker camps" house
over 1.2 million migrant workers in Qatar).
103. Id. at 44.
104. See id. at 58 (observing a sponsor's duty to notify the Ministry of the Interior if
a worker leaves his job without his sponsor's express consent); see also MIGRANT
FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 1 (analyzing how domestic workers are left with few
options to terminate their employment and that in most scenarios, the only option
they have is to leave without their employer's consent, which often amounts to the
crime of "absconding").
105. See Murray, supra note 24, at 468-69 (recognizing that migrant workers
outnumber Qataris in most economic sectors).
106. Shamir, supra note 24, at 115.
107. See MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 1 (explaining that the kafala system's
contract arrangements limit how long migrant workers can legally stay in the country).
108. See Murray, supra note 24, at 469 (positing that granting migrants citizenship
would have the effect of diminishing Qatar's "Arab-Islamic identity").
109. Id.
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generally guaranteed employment in the public sector." 0 Cheap
foreign labor has also helped to create a high standard of living for
Qatar's citizens by allowing the middle class to employ foreign
workers in their homes and in private businesses."' Qatari citizens
can further benefit from the sponsorship system simply by taking on
the role of a sponsor, without having to employ a migrant worker."'
D. Relevant Regulation of Migrant Labor and Human Trafficking
1. The UN Trafficking Protocol
This year marks the sixteenth anniversary of the UN Trafficking
Protocol."' The UN Trafficking Protocol-which supplements the
UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime ("UN
Organized Crime Convention")-is an international tool to combat
human trafficking.1 14 The UN Trafficking Protocol is applauded for
being the first international instrument to recognize multiple forms
of human trafficking and is credited with creating the first
internationally agreed-upon definition of human trafficking."' It
"requires a comprehensive international approach in the countries of
origin, transit and destination" to prevent and combat human
trafficking."' To further its mission, the UN Trafficking Protocol
encourages states to follow the "Three Ps" paradigm: (1) prevention of
trafficking; (2) protection of victims; and (3) prosecution of traffickers. 117
110. Id.
111. See id. (acknowledging that many Qatari citizens employ cheap migrant
workers in their homes and that even housing projects for lower-income citizens are
commonly built with servant quarters).
112. Id. (stating that by just sponsoring migrant workers and providing them with
visas, citizens can earn up to $1360).
113. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 11.
114. Mohamed Y. Mattar, Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, in
Countries of the Middle East: The Scope of the Problem and the Appropriate Legislative
Responses, 26 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 721, 721-22 (2003); see Roza Pati, States' Positive
Obligations with Respect to Human Trafficking: The European Court of Human Rights
Breaks New Ground in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, 29 B.U. INT'L L.J. 79, 115 (2011)
(declaring the UN Trafficking Protocol to be "the most important modern-day
instrument" addressing the issue of human trafficking).
115. Li, supra note 34, at 308; Laura L. Shoaps, Comment, Room for Improvement:
Palermo Protocol and the Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 17 LEwIS & CLARK L. REv. 931,
933 (2013).
116. UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xxxviii, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 343.
117. Shamir, supra note 24, at 89; see also UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42,
T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xxxix, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 344.
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The UN Trafficking Protocol mandates that state parties take
necessary measures to criminalize the offense of human trafficking
and adopt anti-trafficking measures."' It also requires state parties to
provide or strengthen the training of their law enforcement officers
and other relevant officials to further the goals of the "Three Ps."1 1 9
To ensure that state parties comply with the UN Trafficking Protocol,
the UN Convention on Organized Crime established a Conference of
Parties responsible for conducting periodic reviews and examinations
to monitor state parties' implementation of the UN Organized Crime
Convention and the UN Trafficking Protocol.120 The Conference of
Parties acts as a tool to pressure state parties into complying with
their obligations under the UN Organized Crime Convention and
the UN Trafficking Protocol."' While the UN Trafficking Protocol is
a valuable tool in the fight against human trafficking, it lacks effective
enforcement measures. 22
118. UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xxxix-xl, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 344-45; Shoaps, supra note 115, at 947; see Pati, supra note 114, at 118
(indicating that a state party must ratify the UN Organized Crime Convention to be a
party to the UN Trafficking Protocol since the two treaties are interpreted together).
119. UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xlii-xliii, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 347; Shoaps, supra note 115, at 939.
120. UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, art. 32(1), Nov. 15,
2000, T.I.A.S. No. 13127, 2225 U.N.T.S. 209 [hereinafter UN Organized Crime
Convention]; see Li, supra note 34, at 308 (noting that the Conference of Parties requires
each state party to provide information regarding the measures that it is taking to
implement the UN Organized Crime Convention and the UN Trafficking Protocol).
121. Pati, supra note 114, at 120-21. The United Nations (UN) has also
established human rights mechanisms, such as a Special Rapporteur on Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children, to target the human rights violations
resulting from human trafficking. See Mohamed Y. Mattar, Comparative Models of
Reporting Mechanisms on the Status of Trafficking in Human Beings, 41 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1355, 1358-59 (2008) (recognizing the Special Rapporteur's duties to
investigate the scope of human trafficking among state parties, report on
government actions, and recommend policy changes).
122. Shoaps, supra note 115, at 950. Although the UN Organized Crime
Convention establishes a Conference of the Parties to the Convention, it establishes
no mechanism to hear complaints. See UN Convention Against Organized Crime,
supra note 120, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xxxi, 2225 U.N.T.S. at 298; cf PHILIP ALSTON &
RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS: THE SUCCESSOR TO INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW, POLITICS AND MORALS 762 (2013) (explaining the
role of UN human rights treaty bodies, which are created to monitor, implement,
and further develop the treaty in which the body was created). One such body is the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Committee, whose functions
consist of considering states' reports, adopting general comments, examining
complaints brought by victims, and implementing an interstate complaints
procedure. ALSTON & GOODMAN, supra, at 763.
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Currently, there are 166 state parties to the UN Trafficking
Protocol.'1 3 Treaties such as the UN Trafficking Protocol are legally
binding, and under the Vienna Convention, state parties are "obliged
to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of a
treaty [if they have] signed the treaty or [have] exchanged
instruments [such as accession] constituting the treaty subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval."' 24 Qatar acceded to the UN
Trafficking Protocol in 2009; thus, Qatar has demonstrated its
consent to be bound by the treaty and its specific provisions."
2. The ILO Conventions
Where the UN Trafficking Protocol has struggled to address
human trafficking for forced labor, the ILO conventions arguably
aim to resolve this shortcoming."' The ILO is a specialized agency of
the UN whose mission is to enhance the labor conditions for workers
worldwide."' The ILO has enacted eight fundamental labor
conventions governing workers' rights.'28 Two, the Forced Labour
123. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 11.
124. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 18(a), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331; see id., art. 11, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 335 (noting that accession
demonstrates a state party's consent to be bound by a treaty); see also JEFFREY L.
DUNOFF ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw: NORMs, AcTORs, PROCESS 40 (3d ed. 2010)
(emphasizing the binding authority of treaty law and arguing that state parties enter
into treaties to obtain binding commitments from other state parties). See generally
Vincy Fon & Francesco Parisi, The Economics of Treaty Ratification, 5J.L. ECON. & POL'Y
209, 210 (2009) (explaining that the purpose of the Vienna Convention was to set
guidelines for treaty-making by establishing key treaty law principles).
125. See Status of Treaties: Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime, UNrTED NATIONS TREATY COLLEcTION,
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280051ba9 (last
updated Nov. 20, 2015) (indicating Qatar's accession to the UN Trafficking Protocol
on May 5, 2009).
126. See Elizabeth M. Bruch, Models Wanted: The Search for an Effective Response to
Human Trafficking, 40 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 23-26 (2004) (asserting that the
International Labour Organization (ILO) has been underutilized in its efforts for
addressing human trafficking, but that because of the ILO's focus on child
trafficking and more recent attention to human trafficking in general, its frameworks
could potentially be used to combat more types of trafficking); see also sources cited
infra notes 129-33 (describing several ILO conventions aimed specifically at
combating forced labor).
127. Azadeh Erfani, Comment, Kicking Away Responsibility: FIFA's Role in Response to
Migrant Worer Abuses in Qatar's 2022 World Cup, 22 JEFFREY S. MOoRAD SPORTS LJ. 623, 639
(2015); see Crocombe, supra note 1, at 48 (noting that as an agency of the UN, the ILO
"facilitates cooperation between governments, employers, and workers' organizations").
128. Crocombe, supra note 1, at 49.
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Convention 2 9 and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention, so are
especially relevant to the matter of forced labor in Qatar.
The ILO recognizes that trafficking in persons for the purpose of
forced labor is a growing international concern that requires urgent
action."' In its Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention,
the ILO recognized various international instruments such as the UN
Trafficking Protocol, but argued that the adoption of certain labor
proposals is necessary to address gaps in the implementation of these
international instruments.' 2  Additionally, the ILO offered
supplementary recommendations to the Forced Labour Convention
to reaffirm that prevention, protection, and remedies are necessary to
sustain the suppression of forced labor. '" Thus, the ILO conventions
supplement the UN Trafficking Protocol where it struggles to address
all the issues of human trafficking for forced labor. 1
3. Qatar's human trafficking and labor legislation
Qatar's anti-trafficking law, Law No. 15 of 2011, prohibits all forms
of sex and labor trafficking and requires "all [competent authorities
to] implement the provisions of this law and ... publish it in the
Official Gazette."s' Qatar's definition of trafficking under Law No.
15 is in accordance with the three-part definition used by the UN
Trafficking Protocol,'"' outlining "exploitation" to include "forced
129. Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, art. 1(1), May 1,
1932, 39 U.N.T.S. 55 (requiring members to "suppress the use of forced or
compulsory labour in all its forms within the shortest possible period").
130. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour, art. 2, adoptedJune
25, 1957, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-3, 320 U.N.T.S. 291 (requiring members to "secure
the immediate and complete abolition of forced or compulsory labour").
131. Protocol of 2014 to the Forced Labour Convention, 1930, June 11, 2014, 53
I.L.M. 1232, 1232.
132. See id. at 1233 ("[T]he measures referred to in this Protocol shall include
specific action against trafficking in persons for the purposes of forced or
compulsory labour.").
133. Int'l Labour Conference, Recommendation on Supplementary Measures for
the Effective Suppression of Forced Labour 2 (June 11, 2014).
134. See HARROFF-TAVEL & NAsRI, supra note 19, at 21 (arguing that the UN
Trafficking Protocol and the ILO Forced Labour Conventions are clearly linked
because the Protocol's definition of "exploitation" is encompassed by the definition
of "forced labour" used in the ILO Forced Labour Convention No. 29).
135. Law No. 15 of 2011 Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, arts. 2, 28
Qatar Official Gazette Issue 11, http://www.almeezan.qa/LawView.aspx?opt&LawD=
2512&language=en [hereinafter Law No. 15 of 2011].
136. THE CONCEPT OF "EXPLOITATION", supra note 40, at 65; see supra notes 39-42
and accompanying text (discussing the "action," "means," and "purpose" elements of
human trafficking). Under Qatar's definition of human trafficking, the "action"
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labor or the forced rendering of services, [and] slavery or practices
similar to slavery."1 7  The law requires authorities to ensure the
protection of victims of human trafficking, and it prevents the
prosecution of victims for offenses committed as a result of being
trafficked.'" Additionally, the law provides for penalties of up to
seven years imprisonment, up to $82,000 in fines, and penalties of up
to fifteen years in prison when there are aggravating circumstances.'
Law No. 14 of 2004, Qatar's labor law, regulates labor in the private
sector and seeks to protect workers who are at risk of exploitation.1 40
The law mandates certain protections for workers, and it requires
limits on working hours, as well as rest days and rest periods."' The
law prohibits employers from retaining wages, and it requires
employers to take necessary precautionary measures to ensure
employees' safety.' 4 1 Unfortunately, this law does not apply to
domestic workers, and it denies migrants the right to form a union."'
Qatar is making significant efforts to combat human trafficking. 44
Qatar's 2022 Supreme Committee for Delivery and Legacy ("2022
Supreme Committee"), which was established to organize the 2022
element refers to whoever "deals in a coercive or transactional way with a natural
person, including the use, transport, delivery, harbouring, reception or receipt"; the
"means" element includes the "means of force, violence or threat[,] ... abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power, or exploitation"; and the "purpose" element refers
to the exploitation of victims. Law No. 15 of 2011, supra note 135, art. 2.
137. See Law No. 15 of 2011, supra note 135, art. 2.
138. Id. arts. 4-5.
139. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2014, supra note 101, at 321. For a full
definition of human trafficking under Qatar's law, see Law No. 15 of 2011, supra note
135, art. 2.
140. Law No. 14 of 2004 on the Promulgation of Labour Law, art. 4, Qatar Official
Gazette Issue 9, See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 440 (citing the abuse and
exploitation of migrant workers as one of five main abuses that correspond with
mega-sporting events).
141. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 285; see Law No. 14 of
2004, supra note 140, art. 73 (indicating that the maximum working hours shall be
forty-eight hours per week); id., art. 74 (indicating that the maximum working hours
per day shall not exceed ten hours); id., art. 75 (requiring a paid weekly rest of at
least twenty-four consecutive hours).
142. Law No. 14 of 2004, supra note 140, art. 70; see id. art. 100 (requiring an
employer to take all precautionary measures to protect workers from any
occupational injuries or diseases that may arise from the work performed).
143. Id. art. 3.; see id. art. 116 (noting that membership in a union is limited to
Qatari workers).
144. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 47, 284 (recognizing
that as a Tier 2 Watch List country, the Qatari government is making significant
efforts to comply with the provisions under the TVPA).
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World Cup, issued mandatory labor standards for all construction
and service delivery contracts in connection with the 2022 World
Cup. 145 The standards include policies that prohibit recruitment
fees, a hotline for workers' complaints, and independent auditing to
ensure compliance with the standards.'46 Other efforts include
government labor inspections to monitor work conditions and the
establishment of the Qatar Foundation for Protection and Social
Rehabilitation ("QFPSR"), which aims to identify victims of human
trafficking and respond to their needs.147
II. QATAR VIOLATES THE GOALS OF THE UN PROTOCOL BECAUSE OF
ITS IMPLEMENTATION OF THE KAFALA SYSTEM
Because Qatar's implementation of the kafala system makes the
Qatari government complicit in human trafficking, the kafala system,
as it stands, violates the UN Trafficking Protocol. Qatar fails to satisfy
the requirements of the UN Trafficking Protocol because its kafala
system leads to the exploitation and human trafficking of migrant
workers.14 8  Thus, the Qatari government is complicit in human
trafficking."' Complicity in human trafficking violates a state's
obligations under the UN Trafficking Protocol.`0 Given the increase in
the demand for labor in preparation for the 2022 World Cup, the Qatari
government must take action to save the lives of these migrant workers
and to come into compliance with the UN Trafficking Protocol.15
145. Id at 286 (stating that these standards are stricter than Qatar's current labor law).
146. Id.
147. See id. at 285-86 (acknowledging the efforts of the QFPSR, including the
operation of shelters for victims and the implementation of awareness campaigns).
148. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 440-41 (stating that migrant
workers in Qatar suffer abuse and exploitation from human trafficking and forced
labor violations committed through Qatar's kafala system); see also UN Trafficking
Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xxxviii, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 343 (declaring that
states have a responsibility to prevent trafficking, punish traffickers, and protect victims).
149. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 284-85 (discussing
the Qatari government's inadequate enforcement efforts, and concluding that Qatar
does not comply with the "minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking").
150. See UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xxxix, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 344 (stating that the Protocol purports to "prevent and combat
trafficking in persons").
151. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 440 (stating that after Qatar's
successful bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup, the country has attracted
international criticism of its mistreatment of low-wage migrant workers).
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A. Complicity in Human Trafficking Violates the UN Protocol
The UN Trafficking Protocol declares that an international
approach and cooperation between state parties is required to
combat the offense of human trafficking.' 2 As mentioned, the UN
Trafficking Protocol focuses on the prevention of human trafficking,
protection of victims, and prosecution of traffickers." As established
by the Vienna Convention, state parties are required to uphold the
object and purpose of the UN Trafficking Protocol if they have
exchanged instruments of ratification and expressed consent to be
bound.'5 4 Therefore, these state parties are required to comply with
the articles laid out in the UN Trafficking Protocol to the best of
their abilities.' State parties may be seen as complicit in human
trafficking if they fail to honor the "Three Ps" goals of the UN
Trafficking Protocol.
State parties who fail to prevent human trafficking are complicit in
human trafficking. Under its goal of "prevention," Article 9 of the
UN Trafficking Protocol directs states to establish comprehensive
measures to prevent human trafficking.' Such comprehensive
measures include promoting cooperation between state parties to
alleviate factors that make persons vulnerable to human trafficking."5
Additionally, states should adopt measures to discourage the demand
for human trafficking.' 8 Established state systems and regulations
152. See UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xxxviii, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 343.
153. UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xxxix, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 344; see supra note 117 and accompanying text (highlighting the "Three
Ps" paradigm of human trafficking as goals that are encouraged under the UN
Trafficking Protocol).
154. Vienna Convention, supra note 124, 25 I.L.M. at 556, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336; see
Kelly E. Hyland, The Impact of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, 8 HUM. RTs. BRIEF 30, 31 (2001) (noting that
the UN Trafficking Protocol chose to forgo mandatory protection and assistance
provisions due to the high costs these mandatory requirements would impose on
developing countries, but also that the language places greater responsibility on
developed countries to provide assistance).
155. SeeVienna Convention, supra note 124, 25 I.L.M. at 556, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 336.
156. UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xlii, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 346-47.
157. See id., T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xlii, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 347 (citing poverty,
underdevelopment, and lack of equal opportunity as factors that make persons
vulnerable to human trafficking).
158. Id., T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xlii, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 347; see UNrTED NATIONS OFFICE ON
DRUGS AND CRIME, UNrIED NATIONS, INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR AcnON TO
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that create unequal bargaining power between certain populations,
creating vulnerability, would feed the demand of human trafficking."'
These state systems violate Article 9 of the UN Trafficking Protocol,i"
causing a state party to be complicit in human trafficking.
Article 10 of the UN Trafficking Protocol requires state parties to
strengthen law enforcement training to focus on methods that seek
to prevent human trafficking.'"' One substantial obstacle that
interferes with this goal is the misperceived notion among
governments and law enforcement that human trafficking
encompasses only sex trafficking.' Law enforcement officers who
refuse to recognize labor trafficking as a form of human trafficking
will be unable to prevent human trafficking as required under Article
10 of the UN Trafficking Protocol. Failing to recognize certain forms
of trafficking leads to complicity in human trafficking.'
State parties who fail to protect victims of human trafficking are
also complicit in human trafficking.'" Under its goal of "protection,"
Article 6 of the UN Trafficking Protocol directs state parties to offer
victims of human trafficking protection and assistance.1 5  State
parties are required to assist victims throughout the stages of the
IMPLEMENT THE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS PROTOCOL 11 (2009) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK], https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/Framework
forActioniTIP.pdf (urging states to "[d]evelop or strengthen measures to reduce
vulnerability to trafficking by addressing its root causes including the demand that
fosters all forms of trafficking in persons").
159. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 284 (explaining that
the kafala system gives employers significant power over migrant workers, and also
that abused or misled workers often avoid legal action due to fear or lack of
knowledge, making them vulnerable to forced labor).
160. See UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xlii, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 347.
161. Id., T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xlii-xliii, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 347.
162. See HARROFF-TAVEL & NASRI, supra note 19, at 23-24 (stating that debates over
whether prostitution is a violation of rights, and particularly the issue of consent, has led
to an overemphasis on sex trafficking and failure to focus on forced labor trafficking).
163. See Hyland, supra note 154, at 31 (stating that countries who ratified early
agreements, which failed to define trafficking and were aimed primarily at
combating prostitution abroad, incorporated a narrow idea of trafficking not broad
enough to encompass forced labor).
164. See UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xxxix, xl-xli,
2237 U.N.T.S. at 344-45 (establishing a state's duty to "protect and assist the victims
of such trafficking").
165. Id., T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xl-xli, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 345; see HARROFF-TAVEL &
NASRI, supra note 19, at 152, 157-58 (urging state parties to maintain the privacy of
victims and provide victims with information relating to court and administrative
proceedings, recovery, safety, and compensation for damages).
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criminal proceedings brought against their traffickers.166 If state
parties fail to provide victims with relevant information or the
opportunity to charge their traffickers, state parties will be complicit
in human trafficking.
The UN Trafficking Protocol also seeks to ensure that victims
remain protected from further exploitation.' 6 ' Article 6 of the UN
Trafficking Protocol encourages states to implement measures to
provide for the recovery of victims.' 8 Such measures include
providing victims with housing, counseling, medical and
psychological assistance, and employment and educational
opportunities." The UN Trafficking Protocol also urges state parties
to permit victims of human trafficking to remain in their states.o
Additionally, the UN Trafficking Protocol requires states to refrain
from applying the measures set forth in the protocol in a manner
that is discriminatory towards victims of trafficking."' This may
include recognizing a victim's status as a victim of crime, not a
criminal."' Therefore, requiring the protection of victims includes
the prohibition against the prosecution and detention of victims.
State parties who prosecute victims for the crimes committed during
their victimization are therefore complicit in human trafficking and
violate the UN Trafficking Protocol.
Failure to prosecute traffickers makes a state party complicit in
human trafficking. Under its goal of "prosecution," Article 5 of the
UN Trafficking Protocol requires state parties to adopt legislation
and other measures to criminalize human trafficking as well as
attempting trafficking, participating as an accomplice, or organizing
trafficking.' 3 State parties who fail to take the necessary measures to
criminalize these aspects of human trafficking violate the UN
Trafficking Protocol."' Similar to the goal of "prevention," state
166. Id., T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xl, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 345.
167. See id., T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xl-xli, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 345 (requiring state
parties to provide legal assistance as well as measures to aid physical, psychological,
and social recovery of trafficked persons).
168. Id; see INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 11 (recommending that
states provide trafficking victims with temporary or permanent residency, access to
assistance services, and access to compensation).
169. Id.
170. Id., T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xli, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 346.
171. Id., T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at 2, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 349.
172. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 8, 20, 22.
173. Id., T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xxxix-xl, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 344-45.
174. See Shoaps, supra note 115, at 947-48 (2013) (pointing out that the language
used in Article 5, requiring state parties to criminalize the offense of human
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
parties who fail to recognize multiple forms of human trafficking will
be unable to prosecute traffickers for various forms of trafficking.17 1
In addition, state parties must prosecute all individuals involved in
the offense of human trafficking,"'7 including recruiters and labor
brokers.' 7 7 Failure to criminalize all forms of human trafficking and
failure to prosecute all who are involved leads to a state party's
complicity in human trafficking.
B. Qatar's Implementation of the Kafala System Makes the Qatari
Government Complicit in Human Trafficking and Further Perpetuates the
Occurrence of Human Trafficking
1. The implementation of the kafala system makes the Qatari government
complicit in human trafficking
The kafala system, as it stands, exploits migrant workers due to its
stringent recruitment and employment stipulations. The modern-day
kafala system often leads to the forced labor of migrant workers,
contrary to the goals of the custom of granting strangers protection,
from which the system originates.s1 7  Workers wishing to migrate to
Qatar for work must be recruited under the kafala system, which
frequently occurs through labor brokers or recruitment agencies that
operate in the workers' home countries.' 7 ' Labor brokers play an
important role in connecting available laborers to employers in need
of workers.'o Unfortunately, evidence suggests that labor brokers
charge outrageous recruitment fees in exchange for the opportunity
to work abroad. In addition, they also promise higher wages and
trafficking, is the only mandatory statement in the UN Protocol without a qualifier,
thereby highlighting the importance of this requirement).
175. See Hyland, supra note 154, at 31 (describing that many nations have
incorporated a narrow definition of trafficking into their domestic laws, making
them unable to properly combat all forms of trafficking).
176. See UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xl, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 345 (encouraging states to criminalize those who attempt to engage in
human trafficking and all parties participating as an accomplice, including parties
who organize or direct others into committing the offense of human trafficking).
177. See UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xxxix, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 344-45 (providing a definition of trafficking that includes "the
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons," and stating
that each state shall adopt measures to criminalize "trafficking in persons").
178. Ajawin, et al., supra note 80, at 30-31.
179. See Crocombe, supra note 1, at 42 (pointing out that the majority of
recruitment agencies operate in Southeast Asia); TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT
2015, supra note 6, at 15.
180. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 15.
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better working conditions than what the migrant workers will actually
receive upon arrival to their working locations."'
Migrant workers who rely on recruitment agencies or labor brokers
are usually forced into piling debt.' Migrants often borrow money
to cover the costs of recruitment fees, and when the debt is combined
with exorbitant interest rates, migrants may spend years working to
repay what they owe.18 1 In one instance, a migrant from Nepal took a
loan with a thirty-six percent interest rate and paid a $1500
recruitment fee by leveraging his family's land.18' After fourteen
months, the man was still unable to repay the loan.'18
The effects of Qatar's kafala system lead to the continued
exploitation of migrant workers at their job locations. Once workers
arrive at theirjob locations, they may face significant abuse from their
sponsors or employers.' 86  One common practice is "contract
substitution," whereupon arrival to their destination, migrants sign
new contracts with different stipulations than the original contracts
they signed in their home countries.1"' Migrants sign new contracts
out of fear of deportation, or they are already bonded in debt. "
The kafala system gives sponsors the unilateral power to cancel an
employee's residence permit, deny the employee's ability to change
181. Id.; see HARROFF-TAVEL & NASRI, supra note 19, at 46, 48, 52-53 (indicating
how Private Employment Agencies ("PEAs") realize the potential profits involved in
recruiting migrant workers by charging fees for both selection and acceleration of
the process, relying on these recruiting practices even in countries whose
governments have banned the deployment of migrant workers, and deceiving
workers about the nature of the job, working and living conditions, and the
destination to make workers more willing to migrate); see also Crocombe, supra note
1, at 42 (noting that sponsorship contracts are often written in Arabic, and because
few migrant workers understand Arabic, they are forced to rely on recruitment
agencies to interpret the contracts).
182. See HARROFF-TAVEL & NASRI, supra note 19, at 104 (examining how migrant
workers incur enormous debt as a result of PEAs charging high fees and interest,
creating a high rate of suicide among migrant workers who are ashamed of being
unable to provide for their families back home).
183. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 15 (indicating that
workers may borrow money from family members or friends, or, in some instances,
workers may mortgage their homes to cover recruitment fees).
184. Id. at 15, 17.
185. Id. at 17.
186. See id. at 15, 17-18 (describing the many abuses migrant workers face when
relocating, such as forced labor and sex trafficking).
187. HARROFF-TAVEL & NASRI, supra note 19, at 106 (providing that being
subcontracted to several companies is a new stipulation in the substituted contract
that a migrant would be unaware of until arriving in his or her destination country).
188. Id.
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employment, and deny the employee permission to leave Qatar.'
Some employers or sponsors abuse the system by refusing to return a
worker's passport or visa, enabling them to force workers to continue
working beyond the end of the agreed-upon contract. so
Approximately eighty-six to ninety percent of migrant workers'
passports are kept in the possession of their sponsors, which has
dangerous implications for trafficking."' Without identification
documentation, workers risk deportation or monetary penalties if
they attempt to leave their sponsors.'92  Sponsors are at liberty to
continue exploiting migrant workers without ramification because
migrant workers avoid taking legal action out of fear of retaliation,
and the migrants oftentimes are unaware of their legal rights."' For
instance, employers may accuse migrant workers of theft or fraud if
the workers complain to authorities about working conditions. 94
Domestic workers are especially at risk of exploitation because they are
not covered under Qatar's labor laws.' These forms of abuse are likely
to continue during preparations for the 2022 World Cup, as Qatar relies
on its sponsorship system to employ additional migrant workers.
2. Qatar's operation of the kafala system perpetuates human trafficking of
migrant workers
Qatar's kafala system is covered by the UN Trafficking Protocol's
definition of human trafficking because it uses (1) the action of
recruitment, (2) the means of coercion, and (3) has the purpose of
forced labor.'" Under the "action" element, migrant workers are
recruited in their countries of origin, and they frequently rely on
false promises of increased wages and. comfortable living quarters. 1'
189. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 284.
190. See Katherine Scully, Note, Blocking Exit, Stopping Voice: How Exclusion from
Labor Law Protection Puts Domestic Workers at Risk in Saudi Arabia and Around the World,
41 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 825, 854 (2010) (discussing the implementation and
consequences of the kafala system in Saudi Arabia); see also Murray, supra note 24, at
467 (explaining that an employer or sponsor in GCC states will confiscate passports
and identification documents for the purpose of preventing the worker from
changing employment).
191. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 284.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. INT'L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, supra note 58, at 16.
195. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2014, supra note 101, at 320.
196. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
197. HARROFF-TAVEL & NASRI, supra note 19, at 15, 66.
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Under the "means" element, because of the strict sponsorship
system, migrant workers are recruited through practices of deception
and fraud.' Upon arrival to their work sites, migrants face threats
such as deportation, which require workers to remain under their
employers' or sponsors' control.199  Migrant workers are also
rendered immobile because sponsors confiscate their passports and
deny them the ability to receive exit visas.oo This increases a worker's
sense of isolation and dependence on the sponsor.20 1 In the case of
domestic workers, sponsors may place workers in physical restraints to
prevent their escape.202 One of the most common forms of coercion is
debt bondage. 203 Because of the endless debt that results from high
recruitment fees and low wages, migrant workers feel obligated to
continue supplying forced labor until they can pay back their debt.204
Finally, under the "purpose" element, migrant workers are
exploited to provide cheap, and sometimes free, labor to the
employers and sponsors in Qatar.205 Under these elements, once a
migrant worker's labor is exploited, that person becomes a victim of
human trafficking regardless of whether he or she may have
consented to the work in the first placeo.20  Additionally, a worker's
participation in a crime as a result of being subject to trafficking does not
change his status as a victim. 207 So long as Qatar's kafala system continues
as it is, the human trafficking of migrant workers will continue.
C. Qatar's Kafala System, As It Stands, Violates the UN Trafficking Protocol
Qatar is obliged to satisfy the "Three Ps" paradigm under the UN
Trafficking Protocol because it acceded to the Protocol, thereby
198. Id.
199. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 18 (noting that "fear
of arrest or deportation" prevents migrant workers from "leaving an exploitative
situation or reporting abuse to authorities").
200. AMS. FOR DEMOCRACY & HUMAN RIGHTS IN BAHR., supra note 4, at 26.
201. Id.
202. Anne T. Gallagher, Exploitation in Migration: Unacceptable but Inevitable, 68 J.
INT'L AFF. 55, 61 (2015).
203. Id. at 62.
204. See id. (noting that debt usually increases due to "real or imaginary expenses,"
keeping victims trapped in a vicious cycle).
205. See Murray, supra note 24, at 469, 473 (explaining how sponsors and
employers of domestic workers in Qatar benefit from the cheap labor that migrant
workers provide).
206. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 8.
207. Id. at 7.
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expressing its consent to be bound." State parties who ratify or
accede to the UN Trafficking Protocol are obliged to refrain from
acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the Protocol, as well
as uphold the Protocol's specific provisions. 20 ' For instance, it would
defeat the object and purpose of the UN Trafficking Protocol if a
state party failed to take appropriate measures to combat human
trafficking and comply with its goals.210
Because of Qatar's implementation of the kafala system, it has
failed to respond appropriately to combat human trafficking and to
comply with the UN Trafficking Protocol. 211 Qatar's kafala system, as
it stands, inhibits Qatar from satisfying the goals of the "Three Ps"
paradigm established under the UN Trafficking Protocol.1 Qatar
struggles to "prevent" human trafficking because its efforts in law
enforcement are lacking, which violates Article 10 of the UN
Trafficking Protocol. 1 Under the culture that stems from the kafala
system, greater emphasis is placed on enforcing and preventing
immigration violations than labor violations. 2 14  Thus, Qatar's law
enforcement is ill-equipped to prevent and combat human
trafficking, especially for forced labor.21 ' This results from the failure
to train law enforcement and the misperception that human
trafficking occurs only in the sex industry.1 Qatar's government
208. Supra note 125 and accompanying text.
209. See sources cited supra note 124 and accompanying text (noting the binding
authority of treaty law and a state party's obligations under a treaty).
210. See UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xxxviii, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 343 (stating that the absence of a Protocol requiring a "comprehensive
international approach" to prevent human trafficking does not afford vulnerable
persons sufficient protection).
211. Id., T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xlii-xliii, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 346-47; see TRAFFICKING IN
PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 284-85 (discussing the failed government
efforts to combat human trafficking and to implement sponsorship reform in Qatar,
concluding that "[t]he Government of Qatar does not fully comply with the
minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking").
212. UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xlii-xliii, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 346-47; see supra Section I.D.1 (discussing the formulation and
implementation of the "Three Ps"' paradigm).
213. See UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xlii-xliii,
2237 U.N.T.S. at 347; TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 284-85.
214. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 286.
215. See id. at 285-86 (recommending that Qatar either abolish or significantly
amend its sponsorship system and increase efforts to deter trafficking because of its
failure to prevent labor violations).
216. See id. at 286 (noting that law enforcement sometimes fails to identify labor
abuses as amounting to human trafficking); see also HARROFF-TAVEL & NASRI, supra
note 19, at 24 (explaining how this misperception is prevalent worldwide).
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fails to recognize the extent of its human trafficking problem because
it fails to acknowledge that labor abuse of migrant workers can
amount to human trafficking."' Because of the reliance on the
kafala system to regulate migrant labor, law enforcement turns a
blind eye to recognizing labor trafficking as a crime."' Thus, migrant
workers who fall victim to labor trafficking go unnoticed by law
enforcement."' Without support from law enforcement, Qatar is not
suited to prevent the human trafficking of migrant laborers.220
Qatar also fails to prevent the human trafficking of migrant
workers because the kafala system gives sponsors unequal bargaining
power over its employees, thereby perpetuating the occurrence of
human trafficking.' Because Qatar's kafala system creates unequal
bargaining power between sponsors and employees, the system fails
to alleviate factors that make persons vulnerable to human
trafficking, as listed in Article 9 of the UN Trafficking Protocol."
Qatar also failed to abolish or reform its sponsorship system as it
pledged to do in May of 2014.22' This directly contributes to the
continuance of forced labor in Qatar. 2 24
217. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 286 (explaining how
Qatar's government fails to identify victims of forced labor). According to the UN's
framework for implementing the UN Trafficking Protocol, to strengthen efforts to
fight human trafficking, a better understanding of the scope and nature of the crime
is necessary. INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 5. This includes
acknowledging the different forms of exploitation and different categories of victims
and criminals associated with the crime of human trafficking. Id.
218. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 285-86 (stating that
while the government made visits to work sites throughout Qatar, it failed to do anything
about its sponsorship system, which would have helped address forced labor practices).
219. Id.
220. See id. (indicating that a lack of adequately trained law enforcement has
contributed to human trafficking, and that the government should "significantly
increase efforts to investigate and prosecute trafficking offenses"); cf INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 42-43 (asserting that states may prevent human
trafficking by, among taking other measures, increasing the number of law
enforcement officers trained to identify potential victims of trafficking).
221. See id. at 284 (stating that the amount of power employers have over migrant
workers due to Qatar's kafala system is a factor leading to their high risk of
trafficking); see also Scully, supra note 190, at 854 (recognizing the employer's power
over a migrant worker, which is granted by the kafala system).
222. UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xlii, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 347.
223. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 206, at 285; see also HuMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 441 (indicating that in May 2014, Qatar announced
that its "kafala system [would] be replaced by a system based on employment
contracts"); Peter Kovessy, Qatar Officials Propose Changes to kafala System, DOHA NEWS
(May 14, 2014), http://dohanews.co/qatar-officials-propose-changes-kafala-system
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In addition, Qatar fails to prevent human trafficking because it fails
to adhere to its obligations under the core ILO conventions as a
result of its implementation of the kafala system. Article 9 of the UN
Trafficking Protocol calls for a state party's cooperation with non-
governmental or relevant organizations to assist in the prevention of
human trafficking.2 25 Despite Qatar's status as a member country to
the ILO, and despite its ratification of two core conventions, Qatar
fails to cooperate with the ILO because it has not abolished the use of
forced labor."' Since the enforcement of Qatar's kafala system
directly leads to the occurrence of forced labor, Qatar fails to suppress
and abolish forced and compulsory labor as required under the Forced
Labour Convention and the Abolition of Forced Labour Convention.227
Qatar's kafala system fails to "protect" victims of human trafficking,
thereby violating Articles 6 through 8 of the UN Trafficking
Protocol. 2 28 Because of the strict immigration rules set up under Qatar's
kafala system, migrant workers are criminalized and suffer penalties
rather than protection if they attempt to leave their sponsors.2 2 Victims
who try to leave their sponsors are arrested, detained, and deported for
immigration violations.230 In some instances, employers will bring false
charges, such as theft, against their employees.23 1  Consequently, the
(announcing proposed changes to the kafala system, including new regulations for
changing jobs and leaving the country).
224. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 206, at 286.
225. UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xliii, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 347.
226. Crocombe, supra note 1, at 33-34, 48-49 (recognizing 185 member countries
to the ILO and indicating that while Qatar became a member in 1972 and has
ratified six of the eight fundamental labor conventions, it has failed to adhere to ILO
conventions due to its allowance of abuse and exploitation of workers)"); see also
Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, adopted June 28,
1930, 2030 U.N.T.S. 10 (indicating Qatar's ratification of Convention No. 29 on
March 12, 1998); Convention (No. 105) Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labour,
June 25, 1957, 2422 U.N.T.S. 17 (indicating Qatar's ratification of Convention No.
105 on February 2, 2007).
227. Convention (No. 29) Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour art. 1(1),
adopted June 28, 1930, 39 U.N.T.S. 55; Convention (No. 105) Concerning the
Abolition of Forced Labour art. 2, adopted June 25, 1957, S. TREATY Doc. No. 102-3,
320 U.N.T.S. 291.
228. See UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xl-xli, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 345-46 (listing various measures to protect victims of trafficking).
229. See HARROFF-TAVEL & NASRI, supra note 19, at 60, 119 (noting that leaving
without the consent of one's sponsor amounts to absconding, which is a criminal
offense under Qatar's immigration legislation).
230. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 286.
231. Id.
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kafala system leads to the prosecution, rather than protection, of victims,
which violates the UN Trafficking Protocol.
Due to the imbalance of bargaining power arising from the kafala
system, migrant workers are unaware of their legal rights. 3 1 Migrants
do not always have access to information on relevant court and
administrative proceedings, which violates Article 6 of the UN
Trafficking Protocol. 3 1 For instance, because domestic workers are
excluded from Qatar's labor laws, they are unauthorized to bring
claims against their employers in Labor Court.2 34  Thus, migrant
domestic workers who experience abuse and exploitation in the
course of their employment lack sufficient avenues to seek redress. 3
By failing to offer victims avenues to seek redress, Qatar's kafala
system fails to protect victims of trafficking.2 36
Qatar also fails to enforce legislation designed to protect migrant
workers. Under the kafala system, migrant workers are unaware of their
legal protections. Therefore, authorities fail to enforce the labor
protections guaranteed to workers under Law No. 14 of 2004.37 Since
Qatar's labor laws do not apply to domestic workers and exclude migrant
worker unionization, these groups are inadequately protected from abuse
and exploitation. 3 ' Further, because of the kafala system, victims of
232. See MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 4 (discussing the imbalance of
power between the sponsor and worker under the kafala system, which sponsors can
use to their advantage by limiting communication and withholding wages of migrant
workers); TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 284 (suggesting that
migrant workers "often avoid [taking] legal action ... [due to a] lack of knowledge
of their legal rights, making them vulnerable to forced labor").
233. UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xl, 2237
U.N.T.S. at 345; see INT'L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, supra note 58, at 26 (stating
that Qatari law does not provide domestic workers sufficient access to "courts,
tribunals, [or] other dispute resolution mechanisms" when working under
unfavorable conditions).
234. INT'L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION, supra note 58, at 26.
235. Id. at 20. As a result of "slavery-like" conditions and lack of legal recourse, for
example, five to ten domestic workers from Indonesia seek refuge in the Indonesian
Embassy in Doha, Qatar every day. Id. at 22.
236. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 285 (recommending
that, despite previous attempts, Qatar "extend labor law protection to domestic
workers and ensure any changes to the sponsorship system apply to all workers" and
"provide victims with adequate protection services").
237. HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 5, at 440.
238. Id. at 440-41; Law No. 14 of 2004, supra note 140, art. 116; see HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 5, at 442 (indicating that Qatari labor law does not require
employers to provide migrant domestic worker employees rest days or rest periods,
or to limit their working hours).
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forced labor are punished more frequently than they are protected, which
violates the UN Trafficking Protocol's goal of protection. 2
Finally, Qatar fails to "prosecute" traffickers because the Qatari
government does not enforce its current labor laws and, through the
kafala system, sponsors are exploiting the imbalance of power by
preventing workers from bringing successful claims against them.
Because Qatar favors protecting the status of its native population,
including sponsors, it fails to enforce its own human trafficking
legislation and to prosecute traffickers, thereby violating Article 5 of
the UN Trafficking Protocol. 2 40  Qatar's operation of the kafala
system is an example of how a country's customary practice may
prevail over law.24 ' According to the U.S. State Department's 2015
Trafficking in Persons Report, while Qatar's government reported
investigating eleven human trafficking cases, there were no
prosecutions or convictions under Qatar's 2011 anti-trafficking law.
In addition, there were no prosecutions for recruitment agencies
under Qatar's anti-trafficking law. 2" By failing to criminalize and
prosecute all who are involved in the trafficking of migrant workers,
such as recruitment agencies, Qatar violates Article 5 of the UN
Trafficking Protocol. 2 " Under its 2009 Sponsorship law, Qatar
prohibits employers or sponsors from withholding employees'
passports. 24 However, this law has been rarely enforced; no fines or
239. See MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 4 (explaining that migrant
workers are at risk of punishment when they speak out against abuse); UN
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xxxix, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 344
(declaring that one of the purposes of the UN Trafficking Protocol is to protect
victims of human trafficking).
240. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2014, supra note 101, at 320-21
(explaining that the government's primary solution for resolving labor violations was
to transfer a worker's sponsorship to a new employer with little, if any, investigation
into whether the violations amounted to forced labor; in addition, the government
did not prosecute or convict any trafficking offenders under its anti-trafficking law
during the reporting period).
241. See HEPBURN & SIMON, supra note 29, at 7 (examining how culture and customs
play an important role in determining how a country will enforce certain legislation).
242. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 285.
243. Id.
244. The UN Protocol mandates that signatories adopt legislation and other
measures to establish human trafficking violations as criminal offenses. UN
Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at xl, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 345.
Qatar enacted its own anti-trafficking law in 2011, but since its enactment, Qatar has
failed to meaningfully prosecute and convict offenders. It has instead favored the
protection of its own citizens over migrant workers, in violation of the UN
Trafficking Protocol. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 285.
245. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 285.
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penalties were imposed in 2014 for withholding passports despite
evidence that most workers' identification documents are still
confiscated.24 6 Sponsors also routinely violate the sponsorship law's
requirement that employees secure a residence card for their
employees. Without a residence card, workers do not have access
to health care and are unable to lodge complaints.248 Qatar routinely
fails to prosecute sponsors for the violations that occur as a result of
their power under the kafala system. Because of the kafala system's
effects, the Qatari government fails to satisfy the UN Trafficking
Protocol's "prosecution" goal because it fails to prosecute traffickers
and enforce its legislation. 2 49
III. WHY QATAR'S EFFORTS FAIL TO SATISFY THE UN PROTOCOL AND
WHAT MUST BE DONE
A. Wy Qatar's Efforts Are Lacking
As the above discussion demonstrates, Qatar's efforts to combat
human trafficking have been insufficient. This Section analyzes the
reasons for these shortcomings and offers recommendations for their
resolution. While committees, such as the 2022 Supreme Committee,
implement additional labor standards, these standards lack sufficient
enforcement measures.25 0  Frequently, committees rely on self-
auditing and monitoring techniques to effectively implement new
labor standards.2 1  Unfortunately, self-auditing techniques prove to
246. Id.; s&-AMS. FORDEMOCRAcY&HUMAN RIGHTSIN BAHR., supra note 4, at 28 (estimating
that ninety percent of migrant workers' passports are confiscated by their employers).
247. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 286.
248. Id.
249. Id. at 285; UN Trafficking Protocol, supra note 42, T.I.A.S. No. 13127 at
xxxix, 2237 U.N.T.S. at 344.
250. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 286 (noting that
while Qatar's government sought to punish companies who fail to comport with the
2022 Supreme Committee labor standards, it is unknown whether the government
achieved any prosecutions or convictions for these violations); cf THE CASE AGAINST
QATAR, supra note 36, at 16, 18 (indicating that similar committees with goals to
improve labor standards, such as the Supreme Committee's Workers' Welfare
Standards ("SCWWS") and the Qatar Foundation Mandatory Standards ("QFMS"),
lack credible enforcement mechanisms).
251. See THE CASE AGAINST QATAR, supra note 36, at 18 (noting that "the SCWWS
has a very weak compliance machinery, which relies largely on self-audits"); see also
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 286 (recognizing the 2022
Supreme Committee audits of employment contracts).
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be unreliable and often fail to detect violations of labor standards. 2
Even if violations are discovered, there are few remedy options
available to victims. 2 5 3 Most notably, under the Supreme Committee's
Workers' Welfare Standards, workers are not provided with a means
to change employment. 2 54 Additionally, standards implemented
under such committees are limited in scope. 5 For instance, the
2022 Supreme Committee standards were intended to apply only to
employer contracts arising out of the 2022 World Cup
preparations.5 Therefore, migrants working in other fields, such as
domestic servitude, are not protected under these additional labor
standards.25 Concerns relating to the implementation of hotline
services for workers' complaints are also present.2 5 ' Although
workers may have access to a hotline, many workers are unaware of
the hotline's existence. 2 59 Furthermore, committee standards lack
details regarding who will answer the phone and how complaints will
be handled once received.
Qatar's other efforts, such as government labor inspections, also
fail to eliminate human trafficking. Qatar's government is ill-
252. See THE CASE AGAINST QATAR, supra note 36, at 16, 18-19 (arguing that self-
audits, like those done under the QFMS, are unreliable unless performed by an
independent third party).
253. See id. at 19 (explaining how the SCWWS prefers self-remedy measures rather
than punishing contractors, stating that "[i]f the contractor does not comply, the
workers' welfare committee may at its discretion recommend that contractual measures
be taken," but that self-remedy measures are not actually being implemented).
254. Id. at 18.
255. Id. The SCWWS applies to construction services of the 2022 Supreme
Committee and their other activities associated with hosting the World Cup, but they
exclude the construction of essential infrastructure needed for the World Cup and
projects to be carried out under stakeholder agreements. Id.
256. TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 286.
257. See Murray, supra note 24, at 480 (noting that domestic workers will face a
"myriad of abuses" as long as they are "restricted in their freedom of movement, not
protected against sexual harassment and domestic violence, not recognized as equals
before courts, and paid less for work of equal value"); see also AMS. FOR DEMOCRACY &
HuMAN RIGHTS IN BAHR., supra note 4, at 26-27 (explaining that female migrant
workers face physical, psychological, and sexual abuse in their work places, and they
often run away from their employers; however, without their passports and visas, they
have no recourse or means of escape).
258. See TRAFFICKING IN PERSONs REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 286 (suggesting that
hotlines are unreliable in identifying victims of human trafficking).
259. HARROFF-TAVEL & NASRI, supra note 19, at 144-45.
260. Cf THE CASE AGAINST QATAR, supra note 36, at 19 (analyzing the hotline
implemented under the SCWWS, and noting that no one answered the hotline when
the International Trade Union Confederation placed calls).
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equipped to adequately inspect all labor camps and work sites for
labor violations.26 1  Few inspectors speak the same language as
employees, which limits the inspectors' capacity to effectively inspect
work sites and consider workers' complaints.262  Even when
inspections are effectively implemented, inspectors lack the authority
to meaningfully address their findings.6 3
Qatar's efforts to combat human trafficking fail to satisfy its
obligations under the UN Trafficking Protocol because the kafala
system, the crux of Qatar's human trafficking problem, remains in
place. Despite efforts to implement additional labor standards, such
as the creation of the 2022 Supreme Committee, Qatar will continue
to violate the "Three Ps"' goal of the UN Trafficking Protocol as long
as the kafala system remains as is.261 Workers will remain unable to
change employment, which restricts their freedom of movement.265
Because workers remain tied to their employers, the unequal bargaining
power continues to exist.26 Qatar has failed to remedy the issues resulting
from its implementation of the kafala system; thus, human trafficking
remains, and Qatar continues to violate the UN Trafficking Protocol.
B. Recommendations for Qatar
The implementation of Qatar's kafala system leads to the human
trafficking of migrant workers, making the Qatari government
complicit in human trafficking, which violates the UN Trafficking
Protocol. Qatar must reform its kafala system to comply with the UN
Trafficking Protocol and to reinforce the objectives established under
its current system-Qatar's interest in cheap foreign labor and its
interest in protecting its native population.' Nevertheless, while
Qatar has an interest in cheap labor and in protecting the native
261. See id. at 25 (identifying only 150 labor inspectors employed under the
Labour Ministry in 2013).
262. Id. at 22.
263. Id.
264. See supra Part I (analyzing how the kafala system violates the UN Trafficking
Protocol).
265. THE CASE AGAINST QATAR, supra note 36, at 18.
266. See MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 4 (claiming that unequal
bargaining power exists because the kafeel has the power to alter the terms of
migrant workers' employment contracts, subject migrant workers to poor and unfair
working conditions, and force migrant workers into confinement by confiscating
their passports, withholding wages, and limiting channels of communication).
267. See MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 7-8 (stating that the kafala
system should be abolished to reflect a "rights-based approach" to labor migration,
and making several recommendations on potentially effective reform).
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population, its government should set in place certain regulations
and minimum wages to protect migrant workers and ensure they are
afforded the same rights and protections as Qatari nationals.2 8 One
way of doing this is for Qatar to establish unified standard
employment contracts or bilateral agreements, such as those used
between Indonesia andJordan, or Sri Lanka and United Arab Emirates
(UAE), to protect migrant workers.2 " Under these contracts,
governments would agree to certain provisions regarding the treatment
of migrant workers and guarantees to migrant workers, such as
established working hours and wages. 270 These sorts of contracts would
help to equal the bargaining power between sponsors and workers.
Another possible option for Qatar is to follow Bahrain's
approach.' Under Bahrain's plan for reformation, it established the
Labour Market Regulatory Authority ("LMRA") in accordance with
Act No. 19 of 2006.27 Under Act No. 19, the Minister in charge of
the LMRA monitors the LMRA's adherence to the act, and the LMRA
is responsible for submitting regular reports of its activities and
progress to the minister.2 " The LMRA is charged with sponsoring
migrant workers, rather than leaving sponsorship up to an employer
or private sponsor.27" The LMRA is responsible for regulating
recruitment and work placement.75  Under this system, workers
would no longer depend on employers for entry and exit, giving
- 268. See generally MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 4-5 (describing the
rights, including the right to freedom of association and movement and the right to
legal redress, denied to migrant workers in Qatar).
269. Murray, supra note 24, at 479 (emphasizing that the protections under these
contracts vary, but governments must make efforts to enforce them to protect
migrant workers).
270. AMs. FOR DEMOCRACY & HuMAN RIGHTS IN BAHR., supra note 4, at 28
(explaining the abuses, including subjection to harsh working conditions, non-
payment, and over-time without compensation, that occur in the absence of express
agreements detailing the terms of the migrant workers' employment).
271. See MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 3 (indicating Bahrain's plans to
abolish its kafala system in 2009).
272. Act No. 19 of 2006, with Regard to the Regulation of the Labour Market, art.
3, http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/-edprotect/-protrav/-iloaids/
documents/legaldocument/wcms_232971.pdf.
273. Id. art. 16.
274. Id. art. 4 ("The Authority will carry out the necessary activities to regulate the
Labour market in the Kingdom, regulate work permits and licensing recruitment
agencies and employment offices and expat sponsors/professionals working in the
kingdom with in the limits of this law...."); MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 3.
275. MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 3.
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migrants the freedom of mobility.2 76 Qatar should establish a
centralized system similar to the LMRA that would fulfill a private
sponsor's responsibilities, as well as regulate the recruitment and
work placement of migrants. In doing so, Qatar could eliminate the
unequal bargaining power that exists under its current kafala
277
system. Migrant workers would have the freedom of mobility, as
they would no longer depend on employers for entry and exit.2 78
Qatar must also afford migrant workers the protections guaranteed
to Qatari nationals.27 ' This includes allowing migrants the option of
forming a labor union and extending the labor law to migrants in the
field of domestic servitude.2 s These measures are necessary to
comply with international standards on freedom of association and
collective bargaining.2 1 Additionally, migrants should be afforded
276. Id.
277. See id. at 4 (explaining that unequal bargaining power exists because the
kafeel has the power to alter terms of the migrant worker's employment agreement
leaving the migrant worker compelled to accept poorer living and working
conditions; the kafeel also has the power to confiscate the migrant worker's passport
and withhold the migrant worker's wages).
278. See id. at 4-5 (explaining that one of the major obstacles facing migrant
workers is the restriction on their freedom of movement under the kafala system and
that under the sponsorship system, the employer controls the mobility of the migrant
worker and their ability to change employment). By implementing an initiative, such
as the one undertaken in Bahrain to shift power from private employers to a public
authority in sponsoring migrant workers, migrant workers' dependence on
employers would decrease considerably, and they would enjoy a higher degree of
mobility. See id. at 3.
279. See THE CASE AGAINST QATAR, supra note 36, at 20 (stating that migrant
workers are excluded from Qatari labor law and, therefore, have no rights).
280. See Law No. 14 of 2004, supra note 140, art. 116 (stating that only Qatari
citizens may form unions); THE CASE AGAINST QATAR, supra note 36, at 20 (noting
that current Qatari labor law does not extend to domestic workers); cf Murray, supra
note 24, at 470, 472 (discussing countries such asJordan, who amended its labor laws
to provide protection to domestic workers; Singapore, who passed new labor
provisions to ensure migrants are paid on time; and Bahrain, who passed the
Workers' Trade Union Law of 2002, which established the right to belong to a union
for some migrant workers).
281. See ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-
Up, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://www.ilo.org/declaration/
thedeclaration/textdeclaration/lang-en/index.htm (last visited Mar. 27, 2016)
(listing "freedom of association and the effective recognition of the right to collective
bargaining" as one of the four core fundamental labor rights); International Labour
Standards on Freedom of Association, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION,
www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-intemational-labour-
standards/freedom-of-association/lang-en/index.htm (explaining that the Freedom
of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize Convention of 1948
establishes the right for workers to join and create unions, and the Right to Organise
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certain legal protections in regard to their immigration status. If a
sponsor illegally confiscates a migrant's passport, the migrant should
not be left to suffer the legal consequences.8 Qatar's law
enforcement must focus on investigating claims brought by migrant
workers to ensure their protection and to prevent the occurrence of
human trafficking.2" Once Qatar reforms its kafala system, Qatar will be
able to protect migrants from exploitation and human trafficking.285
CONCLUSION
Qatar's sponsorship system, as it stands, directly contributes to the
occurrence of human trafficking for forced labor. Because of Qatar's
and Collective Bargaining Convention of 1949 establishes their rights to protection
against acts of anti-union discrimination). See generally THE CASE AGAINST QATAR,
supra note 36, at 6 (recommending several measures to improve the plight of
migrant workers in Qatar, including establishing legislation that allows for freedom
of association and collective bargaining for all workers in Qatar).
282. See MIGRANT REFORM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 5 (explaining that one of the
problems of the kafala system is that migrant workers are largely ineligible for
permanent residency status or citizenship; therefore, a migrant workers' immigration
status is determined by sponsors). For a list of scenarios that could lead to a migrant
worker becoming undocumented, see id.
283. See id. (noting several scenarios that may impact a migrant worker's legal
status if his passport is confiscated by his employer); see also INTERNATIONAL
FRAMEWORK, supra note 158, at 11 (emphasizing the need for a human rights-based
approach to the protection of victims, including allowing victims temporary or
permanent residency and non-liability for their involvement in unlawful activity
resulting from their trafficking).
284. UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL INITIATIVE TO FIGHT HUMAN TRAFFICKING, 007
WORKSHOP: FROM PROTECTION TO PROSECUTION-A STRATEGIC APPROACH 6 (2008),
https://www.unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/2008/BPOO7
FromProtectionToProsecution.pdf (urging law enforcement to take a proactive
approach to investigating human trafficking violations, including being
knowledgeable of the law on human trafficking and identifying trafficked
victims); see TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 2015, supra note 6, at 285 (describing
Qatar's anti-trafficking law and the government's minimal effort to investigate forced
labor violations and prosecute human trafficking offenders); see also MIGRANT FORUM
IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 4 (explaining that as the kafala system stands now, migrant
workers have little means of redress for violations of their rights because migrant workers
cannot afford legal fees for representation, and they face punishment, including non-
renewal of their contract, abuse, false accusations, deportation, and lower wages should
they report abuse, protest, or question the terms of their employment).
285. Several GCC countries have attempted to reform the kafala system to mitigate
the plight of migrant workers. See MIGRANT FORUM IN ASIA, supra note 21, at 2-3.
Specifically, Bahrain has made great strides to reform the kafala system by
implementing a public authority to be responsible for sponsoring migrant workers
instead of employers. See id. at 3. Bahrain's initiatives have afforded migrant workers
some degree of mobility and flexibility once their employment contract expires. See id
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reliance on the kafala system, Qatar fails to prevent human
trafficking, protect victims, and prosecute traffickers. Thus, the
implementation of the kafala system leads to the Qatari government's
complicity in human trafficking, which violates the UN Trafficking
Protocol. Although Qatar has attempted to remedy the exploitation
of migrant workers through its enactment of the 2022 Supreme
Committee and the QFPSR, Qatar is not doing enough."8 Qatar
must significantly reform its sponsorship system to comply with the
UN Trafficking Protocol and to eliminate the human trafficking of
migrant workers. Reforming the system is an effective way to protect
the rights of migrant workers, while also maintaining control over the
influx of migrant workers.
Qatar will rely on the labor of approximately one million migrant
workers to complete its projects for the 2022 World Cup.2" The
ITUC already estimates that 1200 migrant workers have died since
FIFA awarded Qatar the World Cup bid in 2010.288 Unfortunately, it
is difficult to assess how accurate this number is because diplomatic
sources suggest that the Qatari government conceals the actual
number of deaths to continue the flow of migrant labor.28 ' The 2022
World Cup should act as a catalyst for social change and labor reform
in Qatar. 2 0  Because of Qatar's vast wealth, Qatar has the financial
means to implement reforms and improve the status of migrant
workers. With the 2022 World Cup quickly approaching, Qatar must
act soon to protect the rights of migrant workers and possibly save lives.
286. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text (explaining Qatar's efforts to
combat human trafficking).
287. Crocombe, supra note 1, at 41 (citing INT'L TRADE UNION CONFEDERATION,
UNION VIEw #21: HIDDEN FACES OF THE GULF MIRACLE 3-4 (2011), http://www.ituc-
csi.org/IMG/pdf/VSQatarEN-final.pdf.
288. THE CASE AGAINST QATAR, supra note 36, at 15.
289. Id. at 14; see Wesley Stephenson, Have 1,200 World Cup Workers Really Died in
Qatar?, BBC NEWS (June 6, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-33019838
(noting that a BBC team was arrested in Qatar in May 2015 for trying to uncover
stories of workers' suffering).
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